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Abstract 
In this article we add to the literature analyzing wages in the nonprofit sector by estimating a wage 
function based on employer-employee matched data for Austria. We concentrate on the influence of 
voluntary contributions on the wage level of paid workers. By using a quantile regression approach we 
find that the existence of volunteers reduces the wages of paid employees in nonprofit organizations. 
The number of volunteers, however, does not have an influence on the wage level. Donations have a 
small but positive effect for higher income groups only. By contrast, public subsidies increase wages of 
all paid workers in a nonprofit organization.  
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1. Introduction 
Wages are a complex and important topic for every organization using paid labor inputs, since they 
affect both the well-being of workers and the success of the organization. They influence motivation, 
work satisfaction, productivity, worker fluctuation, cost and profit, to name just a few aspects. It is not 
only a worker’s individual wage level that matters but also the wage dispersion or the change in wages 
over time.  
In our analysis we want to focus on the wage level of workers in the nonprofit sector. We explore 
whether the idiosyncrasies of nonprofit organizations have an effect on the wage setting process which 
might serve to explain differences between the wage setting processes in nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. Various studies have been undertaken already analyzing wage levels in the nonprofit 
sector. Most often, this work compares wages of nonprofit and for-profit workers, either generally or in 
specific fields such as child care or elderly care. The results of these comparative studies depend 
heavily on the set of control variables that are included in the wage equation. These variables have 
usually included individual workers’ characteristics and/or organizational characteristics which are 
seen to co-determine the wage level of an individual. Previous studies have either used individual-level 
data (e.g. Goddeeris, 1988; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1989; Preston, 1990; Ruhm & Borkoski, 2003; 
Shackett & Trapani, 1987; Weisbrod, 1983) or data at the organizational level (e.g. Preston, 1988). 
This paper, by comparison examines nonprofit wages on the basis of matched employer-employee data 
combining both data categories in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of wage determination 
(Borjas, Frech, & Ginsburg, 1983; Holtmann & Idson, 1993; Mocan & Tekin, 2003; Noguchi & 
Shimizutani, 2007), which few studies have done to date. 
According to the suggested definition of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project a 
nonprofit organization can be defined as an organization that is (i) non-governmental in basic structure, 
(ii) self-governing, (iii) formally constituted, (iv) nonprofit distributing and (v) voluntary to some 
meaningful extent (Salamon & Anheier, 1992, p. 1). Nonprofit organizations differ from for-profit 
organizations especially with regard to the latter two characteristics. We argue that when adapting 
standard wage functions to a nonprofit specific context, these idiosyncrasies should be taken into 
account.  
Interestingly, while many researchers find the non-distribution constraint of nonprofit organizations to 
be an important feature for the analysis of wages in that sector, the second idiosyncrasy of nonprofit 
organizations, namely the organization being voluntary to some meaningful extent, has widely been 
neglected in the modelling of wages in the nonprofit sector. The focus of our analysis lies, therefore, in 
the relationship between wages and the voluntariness of a nonprofit organization. We include voluntary 
contributions a) in time (i.e. volunteers) and b) in money (i.e. private donations and public subsidies) in 
the wage equation and analyze wages of workers in the nonprofit sector. We define public subsidies as 
voluntary contributions because organizations do not have to offer anything specific in return for the 
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public transfer they receive2. Our research questions are: Do voluntary contributions – in the form of 
the existence and the number of volunteers, donations and public subsidies – influence the wages of 
paid workers in nonprofit organizations? Furthermore, if they do in what way do they affect paid 
workers’ wages?  
To our knowledge, volunteering activity has not been accounted for in wage equations for nonprofit 
workers, so far3. We use a quantile regression approach in order to answer our research questions. 
Quantile regression enables us to implicitly account for the wage dispersion since we can test if the 
independent variables have a different effect on the various quantiles of the wage distribution. So far, 
nonprofit wages have not been analyzed with this method, although the quantile regression approach is 
quite common for wage estimations in other sectors (e.g. Blaise, 2005; Machado & Mata, 2005). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of relevant theories 
and existing literature. Also, hypotheses about the effect of volunteers, donations and public subsidies 
on wages are proposed. In section 3, we describe the data and estimation method, before presenting our 
results in section 4. In section 5 we draw conclusions for the evidence presented in the preceding 
sections  
2. Theoretical Considerations on Wages in the Nonprofit Sector and prior 
  research 
In this section we outline why we think that volunteers, donations and public subsidies influence the 
wage level of workers in the nonprofit sector and present relevant findings from prior research. 
2.1 Volunteering and the Wages of Paid workers 
Volunteers are often involved in the production of collective-type goods such as health and education 
and are particularly important for nonprofit suppliers of these goods (Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987, p. 
159; Steinberg, 2003, p.289). The relationship between paid staff and volunteers is complex, since 
volunteers’ roles are diverse and not necessarily distinctive from paid workers’ roles (Netting, 
O'Connor, Thomas, & Yancey, 2005, p. 192)4.  
There are several arguments, why volunteers might influence wages of paid nonprofit workers. First, 
volunteers could serve as a proxy for specific characteristics of paid workers in the nonprofit sector5. 
The labor donation hypothesis states that workers in the nonprofit sector accept lower wages and hence 
“donate” part of their income because they are doing a socially desirable job (e.g. Hansmann, 1980). 
                                                     
2
 Preston, who analyzes the effect of “donations”, defines donations as “revenue originating from sources other than the 
recipient of the service” (Preston, 1988, p. 344) and thus adds public subsidies to the donations variable. 
3
 There is, however a strand of literature about the motives for volunteering. Volunteering can be regarded as a means to 
increase the volunteer’s human capital and consequently the volunteer’s income from paid labor (see e.g. Day & Devlin, 1997, 
Day & Devlin, 1998, Hackl, Halla, & Pruckner, 2007; Menchik & Weisbrod, 1987).  
4
 Volunteers can be regarded as either complements or substitutes to paid labor (see e.g. Emanuele, 1996). 
5
 Paid workers in nonprofit organizations also work as volunteers in their free time more often than their counterparts in the 
public and the for-profit sector (Rotolo & Wilson, 2006). 
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Volunteers can, in fact, be viewed as the extreme case of the donative labor hypothesis where they 
donate all their working time to the organization (Leete, 2006, p. 166). The very existence of volunteers 
within an organization as well as their number might be an indicator of the high degree of social 
desirability of the organization’s mission and thus of the jobs it offers. A relatively high number of 
volunteers would consequently predict a relatively low wage-level for paid workers. This effect should 
be particularly strong for higher wages (i.e. for the upper wage quantiles), since the labor donation 
hypothesis is presumed to be most realistic for executives and managers as they are most likely to 
perceive the social impact of the organization (Leete, 2006; Preston, 1989). 
Second, volunteers might influence the productivity or the labor cost of paid workers depending on 
the relationship between the two groups of workers, which could either be described as complementary 
or substitutional: volunteers might reduce the need to pay efficiency wages6 (e.g. Borjas, 2005, 
p.463ff.). In addition, through the presence of volunteers, paid workers might be less inclined to shirk 
because of higher social control. Furthermore, in contrast to organizations without volunteers, workers 
who have volunteer co-workers might have different responsibilities either because part of the work is 
performed by volunteer workers or because paid employees train, coach and supervise volunteers. 
Depending on the concrete work, paid workers might therefore need different levels of qualification or 
might have different work loads than workers in organizations without volunteers. So, for example, in 
comparison with paid workers in organizations without volunteers, those working alongside volunteers 
may have higher or lower qualifications or work loads. This would result in a correlation between the 
incidence and extent of volunteering and wages of paid workers. Volunteers may also reduce the cost 
of fluctuation, since they can act as “buffers” when a paid employee leaves the organization, which also 
reduces the need to pay efficiency wages. If volunteers are complements to rather than substitutes for 
paid workers they may reduce the stress of paid workers so that there is less need to pay compensating 
wage differentials (e.g. Borjas, 2005, p.206ff.).  
The third argument on the ways in which volunteers can influence paid employees’ wages concerns 
rent-sharing and property rights theories7. According to the former nonprofit organizations might 
pay higher wages due to the non-distribution constraint, to which they are subject. Managers of a 
nonprofit organization have no profit-led incentive to lower wages in order to increase the profit 
margin, because a nonprofit organization must not distribute these profits to owners. The property 
rights theory on the other hand, states that if ownership is separate from control of an organization, 
managers might not minimize costs since they might derive utility from paying their employees and 
themselves higher wages. It could be argued, as a consequence of both theories, that profits might be 
(partly) channeled to employees through wages. Feldstein (1971) calls this phenomenon ‘philantropic 
wage setting`, Borjas et al. (1983) call it ‘attenuated property rights`.  
                                                     
6
 The efficiency wage is a “wage rate where no shirking takes place” (Mansfield, 1997, p.556). It is higher than the perfectly 
competitive wage and is seen as an instrument to influence motivation and productivity of employees. 
7
 For an explanation of both concepts in a nonprofit specific context see e.g. Borjas et al (1983) and Preston (1988). 
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One could interpret this as a charitable act of a nonprofit organization to its employees since in this way 
it can pay above-market wages. By not having to pay some workers at all (namely volunteers), 
nonprofit rents8 increase, which allows for higher rent sharing with paid workers. Thus, volunteers 
might again augment the wages of the paid workers. 
Fourth, the literature suggests that volunteers might have a direct or indirect influence on the wage 
setting process of paid workers. On the one hand, volunteers on governing boards of a nonprofit 
organization might take part in wage setting negotiations on behalf of the nonprofit organization as the 
employer. Here, it is a priori not clear, if this affects the wages of paid workers in a positive or negative 
way. On the other hand, volunteers might influence the wage setting process indirectly since they 
reduce the bargaining power of employees. If the relationship between volunteers and paid employees 
is complementary, paid employees could be substituted by volunteers more easily so that the 
bargaining power of the employees in wage negotiations decreases. 
Finally, one could also argue that volunteers raise the size of an organization. Usually, the size of an 
organization is included in wage equations since it is positively correlated with wages for a variety of 
reasons, one of them being inferior working conditions (such as more monotonous work) in larger 
firms (for further reasons see e.g. Lallemand, Plasman, & Rycx, 2005, 2007; Medoff & Brown, 1989; 
Oi & Idson, 1999). Very often the size is measured by the number of employees in full-time 
equivalents9. By only including paid employees in order to measure the size of a nonprofit 
organization, one would underestimate the true size of the organization. Thus, a positive correlation of 
the number of volunteers and wages might be interpreted as a size effect caused by the higher number 
of organizational members (i.e. volunteers).  
Summarizing there are five arguments why volunteers could influence the wage level of paid workers. 
Volunteers could either be an indicator for the existence of labor donations or could change the 
productivity or labor cost of paid workers. They could raise rent-sharing possibilities for paid workers, 
could have an influence on the wage setting process or could increase the size of an NPO. In the 
following, reasons why also donations and public subsidies influence wages are presented. 
2.2 Type of Funding & Wage Levels 
Nonprofit organizations often operate in industries that produce goods and services with public goods 
characteristics (Weisbrod, 1977; Weisbrod, 1988). As a consequence, goods or services of 
organizations in these industries may receive either public funding or donations. Dependence on 
outside funding through donations and subsidies can have an influence on wages.  
 
                                                     
8
 A rent can be defined as return over and above the cost of supply or “the return paid to an input that is fixed in supply” 
(Mansfield, 1997, p.A10).   
9
 In the nonprofit context alternative measures for organization size can be found, e.g. the number of enrolled children in child 
care centers (Mocan & Tekin, 2003; Preston, 1988). 
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If an organization is publicly funded through subsidies it could either mean that it has additional rents 
to distribute or public funding could signify a steady and more secure income for an organization in 
contrast to organizations that depend heavily on more volatile types of funding such as donations or 
sales income. Consequently, public subsidies would have a positive influence on the wage level. On the 
other hand, it could also be that the funding body has some control over the employment structure and 
on the wage setting procedure of a nonprofit organization. In the field of long-term care in Austria, as 
an example, service contracts between public authorities and service providers (i.e. nursing homes, 
home care agencies) fix client-staff-ratios. Very often, contracts also specify upper limits for refunds on 
expenditure on personnel. As a consequence wage premiums would have to be cross-subsidized from 
other funding sources. Therefore, higher public subsidies could lead to lower wages. 
Donations are voluntary contributions from private and corporate donors10. A priori it is also not 
immediately evident how donations might influence the wage level of nonprofit employees. On the one 
hand, donations could – as in the case of subsidies - present additional income that raises rents for 
nonprofit organizations. Again, these rents could at least be partly distributed among employees 
through wage premiums. Consequently, higher donations might positively influence the workers’ wage 
level. At the same time high wages could signal high quality goods or services. If donators value 
quality highly, donations might then be channeled to organizations with high wages. 
On the other hand, nonprofit organizations could be subject to public scrutiny. In particular, may be 
held accountable on their wage bills and overhead cost. According to Preston (1988, p. 339), donations 
are modelled as a positive function of the efficiency of the organization and the public benefit that the 
nonprofit organization produces. High efficiency and a high social benefit are rewarded with more 
donations. Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007), in fact, find that donations and administrative efficiency 
are positively correlated especially when the organization is donation dependent. Additional donations 
are spent on providing additional goods or services, thus augmenting the public benefit. In this case, 
wages and donations would be negatively correlated if low wages ‘indicate’ a focus on the mission of 
the organization, while high wages are perceived as a waste or as an indicator for goal deflection 
(Preston, 1988, p. 344f.). High dependence on donations should increase this phenomenon viz. that 
higher donations lead to lower wages especially for the upper wage groups (Oster, 1998). However, 
any relationship between wage expenditures and donations either requires that information about the 
wage bill of a nonprofit organization is available for potential donors or that the management of a 
nonprofit organization is anticipating donor scrutiny with regard to expenditure on personnel. In 
Austria, the majority of nonprofit organizations do not have to disclose their financial statements to the 
general public.  
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 Unfortunately our data does not permit us to separate corporate donations from private donations, although a differentiation 
would be interesting when analyzing the effect of donations on wages.  
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Subsidies and donations may especially influence the wage level at the top end of wage distribution. 
Significant revenues from subsidies and donations could be taken as a signal for good managerial 
ability and performance, so that higher donations and subsidies lead to higher wages for the higher 
wage quantiles (Hallock, 2002: p. 399f). On the other hand, revenues from subsidies or donations could 
also have a negative influence on the upper wage quantiles, because they signify outside monitoring of 
the managers by various stakeholders (Hallock, 2002).  
In summary, public subsidies and donations could increase rents to distribute on the one hand, but also 
could also increase pressure on the organization to keep wages at a low level because they are subject 
to public scrutiny on the other hand. 
2.3 Previous research 
These possible three influences – volunteers, donations and public subsidies - on wages have so far 
widely been neglected when estimating the wage level in the nonprofit sector although they might give 
interesting insight into the management of nonprofit organizations. Notable exceptions are Borjas et al. 
(1983), who analyzed the effects of various financing structures, Mocan and Tekin (2003) and Mocan 
and Viola (1997), who included a ‘publicly supported’ dummy in the wage function, and Preston 
(1988), who included donations and public subsidies as relevant exogenous variables. To our 
knowledge, volunteering has so far not been included in wage functions of workers in the nonprofit 
sector. Possibly, the reason for this is the absence of relevant or appropriate data on volunteers. Borjas 
et al. (1983) suggest that in the field of nursing homes if wages react to changes in public 
reimbursement schemes for-profit homes are more vulnerable to these changes than nonprofit homes. 
Flat rate reimbursement as a cost-minimizing incentive therefore is much more effective in for-profits 
than in the other two categories of nursing homes (Borjas et al., 1983, p. 239f.). Mocan and Tekin 
(2003) analyzed the wages of workers in child care centers and found there were lower incomes for 
full-time workers in nonprofit organizations and higher incomes for part-time workers if a child care 
center was publicly supported (p. 44), but by contrast in an earlier study Mocan and Viola (1997) found 
no statistically significant results in support of this (p. 42). Preston analyzes the effect of donations and 
uses a two-stage approach since she assumes donations to be endogenous (Preston, 1988, p. 344f.). She 
finds a small, but positive influence of donations on wages (Preston, 1988, p. 348). Hallock (2002) 
explores CEO wages and finds that organizations with government subsidies pay higher wages to 
managers compared to organizations without grants (p. 399f.).  
Summarizing the existing research, there are no studies that take volunteers into account when 
analyzing the wage level of paid nonprofit workers, the findings about the effect of subsidies are 
mixed, while donations are found to influence wages in a positive way.  
 
 
 
     7   
     
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
A priori the influence of the variables of interest on the wage level is ambiguous.   
Summarizing all arguments outlined above, volunteers in the organization could be positively 
correlated with paid workers’ wages because rents which are distributed are divided among fewer paid 
employees compared to organizations without (or with fewer) volunteers, because paid employees need 
a higher qualification or take on higher responsibilities and because volunteers augment the size of the 
organization. Volunteers could have a negative influence on the wages of paid employees in nonprofit 
organizations because they indicate the degree to which the organization performs a socially-desirable 
job. The more volunteers there are within an organization, the more working time paid employees will 
probably donate to the organization because of higher moral satisfaction. Also, wages might be lower 
compared to wages of workers in organizations without or with fewer volunteers because of their lower 
than average qualification or responsibilities and because of a smaller need to pay efficiency wages. 
Furthermore volunteers might negatively influence wages because they may decrease the bargaining 
power of paid workers in the wage setting process. 
Donations and public subsidies might be positively correlated with the wage level because of rent 
sharing possibilities or because they might be a sign of the ability of the employees, especially the 
managers. They might be negatively correlated with wages because the funding body has some 
influence over labor inputs and wages or because wages are at a lower level in order to secure or signal 
efficiency.  
3. Data and econometric specification 
3.1 Data 
For the estimation of wage levels we use a unique matched employer-employee data set for Austria. It 
comprises data on employees working in nonprofit organizations and information on their employers. 
This implies that all nonprofit organizations in our data employ at least one paid worker. Matched 
employer-employee datasets contain information on employees and employers and have the advantage 
of allowing us to test factors influencing wages on both the supply and on the demand side. To date the 
nonprofit sector matched employer-employee data have been used only for the analysis of wages in 
certain industries, such as the child care sector (Mocan & Tekin, 2003).  
The organizational-level data were gathered in 2006 by a postal survey that was sent to all Austrian 
nonprofit organizations with at least one employee. In total 5,104 organizations were contacted, and 
947 questionnaires were returned, representing a response rate of 18.55 per cent. We have information 
for diverse industries that are relevant to the nonprofit world, but the postal survey was not sent to 
schools. The questionnaire, while touching on a variety of issues, placed particular emphasis on 
employment, income, expenditure and organizational activities. 
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The employee data used in this analysis are for the year 2005 and are taken from the Austrian tax 
statistics. Using the numerical identifier for the employer, organizational-level data were merged with 
the employee records11. The data refer to 39,613 individuals working in 421 nonprofit organizations 
that were covered by our organizational study. The individual-level data provide information on 
income, sex, age, length of employment, working hours and whether the person was a blue-collar or 
white collar worker. Overall, therefore the data in this paper cover 8.25 per cent of the organizations 
addressed in the postal survey. 
As an income variable, we use the yearly total labor income before tax divided by the days of 
employment within the organization (max. 365 days). The mean daily income is €51.45 with a standard 
deviation of €29.97. We use the log of daily income, as is common in most wage regressions because 
of theoretic and econometric reasons (e.g. Lemieux, 2006). On the one hand, results are more easily 
interpretable and problems like heteroskedasticity or non-normality of the residuals can be solved by 
logit transformation. On the other hand, Lemieux describes the log-linearity of the wage variable as 
“very accurate for most of the range of the wage distribution” (Lemieux, 2006, p. 130).  
All full-time workers earning less than €20 per day and all part-time workers with less than €5 daily 
income were excluded from the data set for plausibility reasons. Unfortunately the data only contain a 
dummy variable if a person works full-time or part-time and not the exact working hours per week. 
Consequently, the part-time workers are a very heterogeneous group since an individual in this group 
could work as little as one hour per week or as much as 34 hours per week.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Matched NPO-tax data 2006, own calculations 
The data gathered from nonprofit organizations by postal survey contain missings for a number of 
items. The number of volunteers has 18 per cent missing values, while donations and subsidies have 
24.87 per cent missing values. We addressed this problem by trying various corrections and comparing 
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 The data in this article are cited as “Matched NPO-tax data 2006” ("Matched NPO-tax data 2006: NPO postal survey by 
Statistik Austria & Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien and Statistik der Lohnsteuer (income tax statistics) by Statistik Austria," 2006) 
Variab le N of cases M ean
Standard 
deviation
log. daily incom e 39,613 37.6441 0.6396704
Volunteer D um m y 39,613 0.7137303 0.4520227
Num ber of 
volunteers/FT E 32,483 3.781148 107.5803
Donations in  
€/FT E 29,762 5629.851 19499.49
Subsid ies in €/F TE 29,762 31807.75 32303.89
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the results. We conducted a complete-case analysis, one with missing dummies and a single imputation 
via the impute command of STATA 9.2 (see e.g. Greene, 2003, p. 59f. and Little & Rubin, 2002). A 
comparison shows that – with one statistically insignificant exception - the coefficients of the three 
regression analyses all bear the same signs and are similar in size. Thus, we chose to present results 
with missing value correction through missing dummies (see Greene, 2003, p.60).  
3.2 Econometric specification 
The effect of volunteers and donations on wages is investigated with a standard wage equation. Wages 
are modeled as: 
ln( )wage X Yα β γ ε= + + +  
ln(wage) is the log of the daily wage before tax, X is a vector that contains variables on the individual 
level, Y is a vector that contains organizational level variables and is the same for all individuals 
working within one and the same organization. 
More specifically, X includes age, age squared, sex, a blue-collar/white-collar dummy, and two 
dummies indicating two specific Austrian contract types as well as a full-time/part-time dummy.  
Y comprises the three variables of interest – a dummy variable whether the organization has volunteers, 
the number of volunteers per paid full-time equivalent, donations per paid full-time equivalent and 
subsidies per full-time equivalent as well as 9 region dummies, 32 sector dummies on a 6-digit level, 
two collective agreement dummies, log full-time equivalents and three variables containing information 
about the staff composition within an organization such as part-time workers, marginal workers and 
women per full-time equivalent. Donations, subsidies, the number of employees as well as the variables 
describing the staffing composition are all divided by the number of full-time equivalents in order to 
take out the size effect in these variables. There are two collective dummies, one that states if an 
organization does not pay according to a collective agreement, but orientates itself on an existing 
collective agreement. A second dummy is included if an organization has no collective agreement. 
Organizations having one or more collective agreements form the reference category.  
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Table 2: Description of control variables 
Variable names Description
age 
age squared 
female 
white collar
apprentice
public contract agent
Full-time dummy 
Volunteer Dummy 
Number of volunteers/FTE
Volunteer Missing Dummy
Donations/FTE
Subsidies/FTE
Missing dummy: Donations, 
subsidies
Industry dummies (32)
collective agreement
no collective agreement (1)
no collective agreement (2)
collective agreement missing 
dummy
part-time workers/FTE
marginal workers/FTE
female workers/FTE
log. FTE 
Region dummies 
Dummy variable, 1 if apprentice, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if public contract agent, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if full-time workers, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if NPO has volunteers, 0 otherwise
Age in years
Age in years squared
Dummy variable, 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if white-collar worker, 0 otherwise; reference 
group: blue-collar workers
Volunteers per full-time equivalent
Dummy variable, 1 if answers are missing, 0 otherwise
Donations (including income from sponsoring) per full-time equivalent
Subsidies (including income from service level contracts) per full-time 
equivalent
Dummy variable, 1 if answers are missing, 0 otherwise
Dummy variables for 32 industry classifications, reference category: 
social services
Dummy variable, 1 if organization has collective agreement: reference 
category
Dummy variable, 1 if organization has no collective agreement but 
pays according to a scheme voluntarily, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable, 1 if organization has no collective agreement, 0 
otherwise
log. full-time equivalents within an organization
Dummy variables for 9 Austrian federal states, reference group: 
Vienna
Dummy variable, 1 if collective agreement questions are missing, 0 
otherwise
proportion of part-time employees (earning more than €323.46* per 
month) within an organization
proportion of marginal workers (earning less than €323.46* per month) 
within an organization
proportion of female employees within an organization
  
*an employee earning less than €323.46 per month is by Austrian law a "marginal worker" 
Source: Matched NPO-tax data 2006 
We use a semi-logarithmic approach, consequently the results can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. 
This means that if the independent variable increases by one unit, the coefficient indicates the percent 
change of the daily wage. 
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3.3 Method  
For analyzing the wage level of employees in the nonprofit sector we use quantile regression. So far, 
quantile regression analysis has not been applied to nonprofit workers’ wages. It permits a more 
detailed understanding about the relation between the exogenous variables and the wage level. While 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression focuses on the mean effect of variable on the wage level, 
quantile regression assumes that the conditional distribution of the wage level, given a set of exogenous 
variables, is heterogeneous. It allows estimating the marginal effect of an independent variable at 
different points of the distribution of the dependent variable. Quantile regression is advantageous to use 
whenever we can assume that an exogenous variable has a different influence on higher incomes than 
on lower ones. We can, for example, assume that a collective agreement reduces the wage spread so 
that the coefficients for the “collective dummy” are higher for the the lower wage quantile than for the 
higher wage quantiles. 
Usually, quantile regression is attributed to Koenker and Bassett (1978) and can be, in brief, described 
as follows12.  
Let ijy  be the log wage of a worker i  in organization j . ijX  is a vector of regressors.θ  refers to the 
thθ −  quantile of the conditional distribution function of ijy . The relationship between ijX  and ijy  is 
given by (Buchinsky, 1998, p. 94): 
( ) ( )| , 0,1ij ij ijQ y X Xθ θβ θ= ∈  
The estimator for θβ  of the thθ −  quantile regression is obtained by solving (Koenker & Bassett, 
1978, p. 38): 
( )
: :
ˆ min 1
ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
i y X i y X
y X y Xθ β
β β
β θ β θ β
≥ <
 
= − + − − 
  
∑ ∑  
where 0 1θ< < . The estimator ˆθβ  is consistent and asymptotic normally distributed. In contrast to the 
OLS estimator it is not efficient (Buchinsky, 1998, p. 95 and p. 98).  
The coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal change of the thθ −  quantile of the conditional 
distribution by a marginal change of the relevant covariate (Buchinsky, 1998, p. 98).  
In contrast to OLS regression quantile regression does not minimize the sum of squared errors but 
absolute errors and is thus less sensitive to extreme outliers (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). Quantile 
regression is more advantageous if the error terms are heteroskedastic or not normally distributed. 
                                                     
12
 For a more detailed overview over the method see for example Koenker (2005) and Buchinsky (1998). 
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By varying θ  it is possible to obtain results for the whole conditional distribution function. Standard 
errors are estimated by bootstrapping13. The method is used when the assumption of heteroskedasticity 
of the residuals is violated. In this case, bootstrapped standard errors are more accurate (Gould, 1992; 
Gould, 1997). In our estimation we estimate the coefficients for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile 
and use 100 replications for the bootstrap. All estimations are carried out with the STATA 9.2 
statistical package.  
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section we present the results from the quantile regression analysis. Table 3 displays the 
coefficients and standard errors for the variables of interest only, the results for the other regressors can 
be found in the Appendix (Table 4). The last column comprises the results from an OLS regression 
with robust standard errors for reasons of comparability.  
Table 3: Selected estimation results from quantile regression and  OLS regression 
Individual and organizational control variables included 
 
Dependent Variable: log. daily income before tax
N=39,613
OLS 
estimates
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Volunteer 
dummy
-0.0740044*** 
(0.0151079)
-0.0930629*** 
(0.0130728)
-0.1069088*** 
(0.0118074)
-0.1008387*** 
(0.0120302)
-0.0671784*** 
(0.013088)
-0.1046794** 
(0.044842)
Number of 
volunteers
/FTE
0.000032 
(0.0001144)
-0.0000147 
(0.0001444)
-0.00000946 
(0.0002351)
-0.0000256 
(0.0000263)
-0.0000503 
(0.0000921)
-0.0000124 
(0.0000105)
Donations
/FTE
-0.0000012 
(0.000000766)
-0.000000677 
(0.000000929)
0.000000268 
(0.000000249)
0.000000395** 
(0.0000002)
0.000000635 *** 
(0.000000247)
0.000000242 
(0.000000302)
Subsidies
/FTE
0.000000708** 
(0.000000292)
0.00000105*** 
(0.000000208)
0.00000111*** 
(0.000000238)
0.00000138*** 
(0.000000214)
0.00000114*** 
(0.000000208)
0.00000113** 
(0.000000469)
Pseudo-R²=0.2949 Pseudo-R²=0.2494 Pseudo-R²=0.2643 Pseudo-R²=0.2670 Pseudo-R²=0.2655 R²=0.4035
Variable
Quantile regression estimates
Coefficient (Bootstrap standard error)
Coefficient 
(Robust 
std.err.)
***  (**) on the 99%-(95%-) level statistically significant 
Source: Matched NPO-tax data 2006, own calculations 
 
                                                     
13
 For an overview of the method of bootstrapping see e.g. Efron and Tibshirani (1993). 
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Two variables have statistically significant results for all quantiles – the volunteer dummy and the 
subsidies variable. The number of volunteers per FTE has insignificant results for all quantiles, the 
donations variable is mixed. The coefficient of the volunteer dummy variable has a negative sign, thus 
the expected wage is lower if an organization has volunteers compared to organizations without 
volunteers. It is, however, irrelevant how many volunteers the organization has as the number of 
volunteers/FTE variable has no significant results. The effect of volunteering is lower at the margins of 
the wage distribution, as the coefficient for the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles are lower than at the other three 
quantiles. Consequently, the hypothesis that the labor donation effect is particularly strong for the 
upper quantiles because managers and executives can best perceive the social impact cannot be 
confirmed here. An individual working in an organization with volunteers earns between 6.7 per cent 
and 10.6 per cent less than an individual in a nonprofit organization without volunteers. The negative 
sign of the coefficient of the volunteer dummy suggests that the labor donation hypothesis might be of 
some relevance. Individuals working as volunteers might be an indicator for the social desirability of 
the good the nonprofit organization produces. If there are volunteers, the paid workers are also willing 
to donate a part of their income, thus accept lower wages. Another explanation might be the 
comparatively lower job requirement profiles or lower job responsibilities. Unfortunately, our data do 
not include more specific information about experience and education, so we cannot control for this. 
Other explanations might be the lower need to pay efficiency wages or the lower bargaining power of 
paid workers due to the presence of volunteer workers.  
Donations have a very small, but positive coefficient at the upper end of the wage distribution. For high 
incomes the expected wage increases with rising donations. Donations here could be interpreted as a 
sign of the special ability of the managers. Larger donations are positively correlated with the high 
quality of managers in the organization. Subsidies also increase the expected wage. In contrast to the 
donations variable, it is statistically significant for all quantiles of the wage distribution. The coefficient 
of both variables is very small, however for the public subsidy variable one additional Euro leads to a 
0.0000708 per cent increase of the income in the 0.1 wage quantile and to a 0.000114 per cent wage 
increase for the 0.9 quantile. While this seems small, when we take into consideration the beta 
coefficients, these effects do not seem as small any more. For example, an increase of public subsidies 
by one standard deviation (amounting to about 32,300€) will increase the daily wage by 2.3 per cent on 
the 0.1 wage quantile and by 3.7 per cent for the 0.9 quantile. An increase of donations by one standard 
deviation (about €19,500) will increase the daily wage by 0.8 per cent on the 0.75 wage quantile and by 
1.2 per cent on the 0.9 wage quantile. Higher wage groups seem to profit more from higher subsidies 
and also from higher donations. The results can be interpreted using the rent sharing theory. Higher 
donations and subsidies lead to higher rent sharing possibilities, although the effect is very small. This 
result corresponds to that found by Preston (1988) who also noted the small, but positive influence of 
donations on the wages of workers in NPOs.  
Summarizing the findings we see that the existence of volunteers lowers the wage level of paid 
nonprofit workers by about 10 per cent compared to workers in nonprofit organizations without 
volunteers. The number of volunteers, however, does not have a significant influence.  
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Donations have a positive effect on wages of high income groups only, while public subsidies have a 
small, but positive effect for all income groups. This result is valid for nonprofit organizations 
engaging in all kinds of activities. 
In the Appendix the results for all the control variables can be found, among them the coefficients for 
our missing dummy variables. When looking at the missing dummies we see that some coefficients are 
significant at some quantiles. The number of volunteers missing dummy is not of much interest since 
we do not have any significant results for the number of volunteers variable. The donations and 
subsidies missing dummy has two significant results for the 0.1 and the 0.25 wage quantile. This 
indicates that these data have missing values to a meaningful degree and we should be cautious about 
the interpretation of the results for the donations and subsidies variable for these two quantiles since 
they might be biased. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we adapted a standard wage equation for one idiosyncrasy of NPOs, namely the 
organization being voluntary to some meaningful degree. This includes donations in the form of time 
and money. Furthermore, we investigated the impact of public subsidies on the wage level of nonprofit 
workers. In addition, we added a volunteers dummy, the number of volunteers as time contributions as 
well as the donations and public subsidies as monetary contributions to the wage equation of paid 
employees. For the estimation we used an employer-employee matched data set comprising 39,613 
paid workers in 421 Austrian nonprofit organizations of diverse industries. By using a quantile 
regression approach we could inspect the relationship between wages and the variables of interest on 
different quantiles of the wage distribution. We found that the volunteers dummy had statistically 
significant results for all quantiles. The expected wage for workers in nonprofit organizations that also 
have volunteer workers is lower for all quantiles, wages at the lower and upper end of the distribution 
are less affected than the middle quantiles. The number of volunteers has no influence on the expected 
wage.  
One explanation of the results could be the labor donation hypothesis, which posits that the presence of 
volunteers indicate the high social desirability of the activity of a nonprofit organization. In 
organizations where volunteers are willing to work, paid workers are also willing to donate part of their 
income. Donations have a small but positive effect for higher incomes. Public subsidies increase 
wages, although the coefficients of this variable are also small. These results might be interpreted with 
the rent sharing theory. Higher donations and public subsidies enable the organization to pay higher 
wages. 
Further research could include a separate analysis for full-time and part-time workers since workers of 
the two categories might nonrandomly select into full-time and part-time work and wages might be 
affected by the regressors differently (see e.g. Mocan & Tekin, 2003).  
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It would also be interesting to distinguish volunteers in our equation by their job tasks in order to 
analyze if for instance volunteers acting as board members have a different effect on the wages of paid 
workers compared to the effect of other volunteers in the organization.  
In our paper we offered various explanations for our findings but we could not single out one concrete 
explanation to explain why the existence of volunteers negatively influences the wages of paid 
workers. It would also be interesting to further investigate these reasons with more detailed data that 
allow for more specific explanations.  
 
Appendix 
Detailed results from the quantile regression:  
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Table 4: Further estimation results from quantile regression and OLS regression 
q10 coef. bootstr. std.err. q25 coef. bootstr. std.err.
age 0.0709634*** (0.0036243) 0.0611012*** (0.0031709)
age squared 
-0.000755*** (0.0000472) -0.0006514*** (0.0000381)
female 
-0.0245387** (0.0110555) -0.0467528*** (0.0075574)
apprentice
-0.1949098*** (0.0478761) -0.2532849*** (0.0359928)
white collar 0.3675762*** (0.0101997) 0.4553715*** (0.008832)
public contract agent 0.6040969** (0.3049092) 0.4493911** (0.225012)
Full-time dummy 1.018247*** (0.0151079) 0.7200578*** (0.0077195)
Number of volunteers missing dummy
-0.0001082 (0.0424189) -0.0914931*** (0.0247463)
Donations & subsidies missing dummy 0.1309476*** (0.0261275) 0.095974*** (0.0176314)
Other hostels 0.2804564*** (0.0568653) 0.1478012*** (0.0409011)
Restaurants ans guest houses 0.0598752 (0.0175747) -0.0342821 (0.0485982)
Buffets -0.3680127*** (0.1233865) -0.5761164*** (0.194474)
R&D in medicine/natural science/agriculture -0.0292463 (0.1457458) -0.1947429 (0.3120945)
R&D in law/humanities/social sciences 0.3673849*** (0.2249689) 0.2452186*** (0.0812916)
Legal advice -0.5043546 (0.4083656) -0.7003895 (0.5075182)
Architectural offices 0.9682833*** (0.1756219) 0.6965897*** (0.1369819)
Technical, physical and chemical analyses 0.1382456 (0.2178779) 0.1411198 (0.2493863)
General public administration 0.5490817*** (0.0317764) 0.208441*** (0.0784453)
Play schools -0.1680372*** (0.0293377) -0.1175524*** (0.0228164)
Elementary schools -0.5760617 (0.570697) 0.1597315 (0.6500859)
Vocational secondary school -0.7118492*** (0.064686) -0.7410888*** (0.1213967)
Universities 0.1055714 (0.2068243) -0.0431388 (0.2404936)
Adult education 0.1850439 (0.042379) 0.039423 (0.0326409)
Hospitals 0.3796795*** (0.0281538) 0.189865*** (0.0287265)
Dentists 0.4172557*** (0.1452956) 0.4989551*** (0.181214)
Rescue services 0.3582262*** (0.0605905) 0.3313358*** (0.0401527)
Home-based care -0.0993849*** (0.0361006) -0.1002073*** (0.0187302)
Psychotherapists -0.0631108 (0.274622) 0.0897561 (0.3259346)
Other health care 0.4273304** (0.2916378) 0.367639** (0.1621304)
Nursing homes 0.2382001*** (0.0183125) 0.1482295*** (0.0167431)
Other asylums/homes 0.0706911*** (0.0394701) 0.0961421*** (0.0199572)
Professional associations 0.0601519 (0.2137002) 0.0086186 (0.2045902)
Religious associaions -0.0294405 (0.0450731) -0.0257569 (0.0328029)
Other associations -0.0551339** (0.0326622) -0.0522737** (0.0212954)
Arts -0.4349965*** (0.1321819) -0.9583845*** (0.09755)
Operation of cultural performances -0.0617868* (0.1491233) -0.2454167* (0.1370323)
Libraries and archives -0.2608886 (0.3703826) 0.1483785 (0.1576169)
Museums and monument protection 0.0529544* (0.1516932) -0.1855689* (0.1000475)
Parks, botanic gardens 0.6972827*** (0.3822291) 0.7730453*** (0.1594409)
Operation of sports facilities 0.3858831 (0.0895855) 0.1968457 (0.1547042)
Other services for sports 0.039419*** (0.0720741) 0.1981338*** (0.0545958)
no collective agreement, but orientation
-0.1353514*** (0.028618) -0.125325*** (0.0184187)
no collective agreement
-0.0478227*** (0.0346745) -0.1033924*** (0.0323955)
collective agreement missing dummy 0.2265478*** (0.0197531) 0.192956*** (0.0157198)
part-time workers/FTE -0.0355221** (0.0175871) 0.0312736** (0.0129796)
marginal workers/FTE -0.0522594*** (0.045845) -0.1277113*** (0.0446447)
female workers/FTE -0.1326335 (0.020003) -0.0181544 (0.0149305)
log. FTE 0.0437373*** (0.0061363) 0.0303552*** (0.0039119)
Lower Austria 0.1233522*** (0.0244257) 0.0555961*** (0.0189759)
Burgenland 0.0456895 (0.031251) -0.0252269 (0.0248755)
Styria 0.1237982*** (0.0493441) 0.1321869*** (0.032195)
Carinthia -0.007376 (0.0475141) 0.0030275 (0.0519924)
Upper Austria 0.2174186*** (0.025946) 0.084321*** (0.016834)
Salzburg -0.0551007*** (0.0470875) -0.1978308*** (0.0481402)
Tyrol -0.0340743*** (0.0341622) -0.0859839*** (0.0335196)
Vorarlberg 0.2218309*** (0.0424429) 0.1084892*** (0.0289283)
constant 0.6576118*** (0.0880248) 1.400104*** (0.0710633)
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q50 coef. bootstr. std.err. q75 coef. bootstr. std.err.
age 0.033018*** (0.0014261) 0.0329468*** (0.0014866)
age squared 
-0.0003213*** (0.0000179) -0.0003137*** (0.0000195)
female 
-0.0751558*** (0.0069995) -0.1216715*** (0.0075849)
apprentice -0.4648869*** (0.0460874) -0.4460233*** (0.0449167)
white collar 0.4527768*** (0.0066169) 0.4569*** (0.0068241)
public contract agent 0.3341648 (0.2312994) 0.2753395* (0.1475907)
Full-time dummy 0.5434035*** (0.0047006) 0.444844*** (0.0051438)
Number of volunteers missing dummy
-0.0868182*** (0.017506) -0.0666873*** (0.0156751)
Donations & subsidies missing dummy 0.0095514 (0.0119662) -0.0184786 (0.0118556)
Other hostels -0.0227446 (0.0295318) -0.0447477* (0.0260756)
Restaurants ans guest houses -0.1323998*** (0.035371) -0.2422704*** (0.0313026)
Buffets -0.6747009*** (0.222024) -0.3500967 (0.4610984)
R&D in medicine/natural science/agriculture 0.1840946 (0.12617) 0.1037766* (0.0578153)
R&D in law/humanities/social sciences 0.175684*** (0.0685332) 0.1417632*** (0.0472402)
Legal advice 0.2948026 (0.7612071) 0.1527561 (0.7155997)
Architectural offices 0.4313948*** (0.0908512) 0.2350903*** (0.0673721)
Technical, physical and chemical analyses 0.1150203 (0.1934897) 0.0882013 (0.2651614)
General public administration 0.0711306 (0.1069993) 0.0128088 (0.1446564)
Play schools -0.0691582*** (0.0106172) -0.0900203*** (0.0067675)
Elementary schools 0.0280276 (0.1813369) -0.1595919** (0.0759584)
Vocational secondary school -0.2258014*** (0.0520482) -0.0284394 (0.0379667)
Universities 0.0843272 (0.2061506) 0.3645732 (0.2325864)
Adult education 0.0538409** (0.0231637) 0.1033805*** (0.0269559)
Hospitals 0.0317194 (0.0210712) -0.0224461 (0.0220672)
Dentists 0.2850962*** (0.1001125) 0.1693635*** (0.0582541)
Rescue services 0.2960692*** (0.0333996) 0.2424267*** (0.0275427)
Home-based care -0.0541969*** (0.0118016) -0.0870714*** (0.0143258)
Psychotherapists 0.3350661** (0.1658858) 0.183077*** (0.0669742)
Other health care -0.0300722 (0.0546533) -0.1075836 (0.102757)
Nursing homes 0.1131722*** (0.0119735) 0.0875479*** (0.0131834)
Other asylums/homes 0.0887874*** (0.0166674) 0.0803906*** (0.0123177)
Professional associations 0.2232718** (0.1035992) 0.1621569*** (0.0633483)
Religious associaions 0.0662644*** (0.0196102) 0.028586 (0.0184629)
Other associations 0.0286563* (0.0173077) 0.0714297*** (0.0170783)
Arts -1.441326*** (0.1923081) -0.3894255 (0.5027552)
Operation of cultural performances -0.4485841*** (0.1690633) 0.0142347 (0.1122221)
Libraries and archives 0.0913159 (0.0667657) 0.0580376 (0.080493)
Museums and monument protection -0.0258673 (0.0955308) 0.1514113*** (0.0585117)
Parks, botanic gardens 0.6130616*** (0.0683545) 0.3778719*** (0.065145)
Operation of sports facilities 0.2423101 (0.2332826) -0.007248 (0.2398116)
Other services for sports 0.2895202*** (0.0551066) 0.4969226*** (0.0814133)
no collective agreement, but orientation
-0.0887967*** (0.0136284) -0.1243671*** (0.0165015)
no collective agreement
-0.1004739*** (0.0222014) -0.1025358*** (0.0196175)
collective agreement missing dummy 0.1321309*** (0.0105145) 0.0678232*** (0.0123782)
part-time workers/FTE 0.0581447*** (0.0091442) 0.0764883*** (0.0105816)
marginal workers/FTE -0.1775413*** (0.0217616) -0.2079252*** (0.0183048)
female workers/FTE 0.0462123*** (0.0116272) 0.0916107*** (0.0103454)
log. FTE 0.0070196** (0.0033642) -0.0020564 (0.0032403)
Lower Austria -0.0890676*** (0.0141577) -0.1175814*** (0.016161)
Burgenland -0.1627419*** (0.0209776) -0.2037352*** (0.0183336)
Styria -0.0255534 (0.0227208) -0.0724353*** (0.0257545)
Carinthia -0.113525*** (0.0281868) -0.1776721*** (0.0287011)
Upper Austria -0.0082775 (0.0121349) -0.0231784* (0.0123415)
Salzburg -0.2167543*** (0.0324756) -0.039866 (0.0297257)
Tyrol -0.1148751*** (0.0207869) -0.1177497*** (0.0164163)
Vorarlberg -0.0247537 (0.022079) -0.0684922*** (0.0213093)
constant 2.519647*** (0.0408035) 2.850809*** (0.0349628)
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q90 coef. bootstr. std.err. OLS coef. robust std.err.
age 0.0327851*** (0.0020902) 0.0515657*** (0.0061229)
age squared 
-0.0002805*** (0.0000271) -0.0005328*** (0.0000766)
female 
-0.1468218*** (0.009389) -0.0704764** (0.0315922)
apprentice
-0.4998354*** (0.0402272) -0.3542278*** (0.0717919)
white collar 0.4346584*** (0.008346) 0.4163256*** (0.067687)
public contract agent 0.1395793* (0.0839925) 0.2950531** (0.1255232)
Full-time dummy 0.3861712*** (0.0064844) 0.6420037*** (0.0212326)
Number of volunteers missing dummy
-0.0070317 (0.0222128) -0.0715329 (0.0582301)
Donations & subsidies missing dummy 0.0052763 (0.0149961) 0.067166 (0.0507797)
Other hostels -0.1349799*** (0.0438502) 0.048158 (0.0870865)
Restaurants ans guest houses -0.3103948*** (0.0790808) -0.0124857 (0.1138919)
Buffets 0.1139685 (0.6069099) -0.4744827*** (0.1313139)
R&D in medicine/natural science/agriculture 0.0933926 (0.0698811) 0.0735015 (0.1326757)
R&D in law/humanities/social sciences 0.1663783* (0.0903073) 0.227134** (0.0996481)
Legal advice 0.5642287 (0.5123111) -0.2311299** (0.1054688)
Architectural offices -0.0650352 (0.0708536) 0.4744472*** (0.1286225)
Technical, physical and chemical analyses 0.2599729 (0.2227593) 0.1320537 (0.1336315)
General public administration 0.0425573 (0.0642264) 0.1775347*** (0.0335189)
Play schools -0.0900196*** (0.0090222) -0.1403148 (0.1037913)
Elementary schools -0.3180986*** (0.0779555) -0.2239386*** (0.0816939)
Vocational secondary school 0.0027655 (0.0313001) -0.3302296*** (0.014966)
Universities 0.2103067 (0.1702777) 0.1763188** (0.0727681)
Adult education 0.0454922 (0.0337467) 0.0724574 (0.0465395)
Hospitals -0.0036173 (0.0425833) 0.1228015 (0.0815524)
Dentists 0.0997963 (0.0761796) 0.3228848*** (0.0880584)
Rescue services 0.0368524 (0.0351457) 0.2745897** (0.1271579)
Home-based care -0.116195*** (0.015576) -0.0740871 (0.0715429)
Psychotherapists 0.1979255 (0.1287766) 0.1094711 (0.1416253)
Other health care -0.1302533 (0.1644855) 0.1006002 (0.1126948)
Nursing homes 0.046987*** (0.0162748) 0.1505082*** (0.054067)
Other asylums/homes 0.0312403** (0.0146313) 0.0840161* (0.0472769)
Professional associations 0.0745126 (0.0858506) 0.0676522 (0.1495369)
Religious associaions -0.0472645* (0.0270874) -0.0068617 (0.1073575)
Other associations 0.0044601 (0.0236955) 0.0142912 (0.0734108)
Arts -0.097337 (0.401774) -0.8078553*** (0.1242089)
Operation of cultural performances -0.103202 (0.1021457) -0.2348805*** (0.0791758)
Libraries and archives 0.0548821 (0.1239459) 0.0726302 (0.0785832)
Museums and monument protection 0.0143811 (0.0541974) -0.0309041 (0.1531597)
Parks, botanic gardens 0.3077502 (0.1987393) 0.5104184*** (0.1284764)
Operation of sports facilities -0.0396018 (0.1398428) 0.1711383* (0.0982121)
Other services for sports 0.3601792*** (0.0436732) 0.2646822** (0.1207688)
no collective agreement, but orientation
-0.1098597*** (0.0205356) -0.103227* (0.0579006)
no collective agreement
-0.0769206*** (0.0248978) -0.0943734 (0.0634599)
collective agreement missing dummy 0.0533725*** (0.0167151) 0.1307722* (0.0699237)
part-time workers/FTE 0.0266118** (0.0125004) 0.051487 (0.0385091)
marginal workers/FTE -0.1574318*** (0.0199518) -0.1461105** (0.0703201)
female workers/FTE 0.0636666*** (0.0132085) 0.0127661 (0.058805)
log. FTE -0.0143002*** (0.0040524) 0.0130282 (0.0107651)
Lower Austria -0.1170853*** (0.0262823) -0.0437185 (0.0667205)
Burgenland -0.2211533*** (0.0275624) -0.0951244* (0.052885)
Styria -0.0396408 (0.028818) 0.017078 (0.0614581)
Carinthia -0.2072511*** (0.032603) -0.1064228 (0.0923848)
Upper Austria -0.0219261 (0.0158848) 0.0323082 (0.0649225)
Salzburg -0.0157226 (0.0304673) -0.1333927 (0.1195829)
Tyrol -0.0964532*** (0.0237695) -0.1088763 (0.0763741)
Vorarlberg -0.070173*** (0.0234534) 0.0276405 (0.0742718)
constant 3.18424*** (0.0558668) 2.006894*** (0.1577107)
***(**)[*] on the 99%-(95%-)(90%-) level statistically significant 
Source: Matched NPO-tax data 2006, own caluculations 
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